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Governor ’s term and information disclosure: Evidence 
from Japan 
 
 
 
Abstract. Local governors that hold office for longer periods are thought to be more 
likely to collude with various groups to increase their own benefit through 
long-term interaction. There is no term limit for local governors in Japan, seemingly 
causing such collusive behavior. However, since 1987, local government at the 
prefecture level has begun to promulgate public information disclosure ordinances, 
which is anticipated to prevent collusive behavior. As of 2001, all 47 local governments 
have promulgated their local ordinances. This paper uses a prefecture level dataset 
from 1987 and 2001 to explore whether the number of years that local governors hold 
office is associated with the timing of the promulgation of public information disclosure 
ordinances. The major finding using survival regression analysis is that the longer local 
governors hold office, the less likely the ordinance is promulgated. This highlights the 
policy implication that the term of local governors should be limited. 
 
Keywords: Multiple terms, information-disclosure ordinance, collusion, survival 
regression analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of an incumbent local governor or mayor is to remain in power and to be 
reelected in future elections. To this end, for instance, they perform fiscal 
manipulations in election years during their terms in office (e.g., Veiga & Veiga 
2007; Sakurai & Mennezes-Filho 2008). Governors may obtain benefits at the 
expense of citizens through colluding with associates such as special interest groups. 
Thus, governors are likely to engage in corrupt activities in pursuit of their 
interests. In some instances, local governors offer monetary gifts to influential local 
identities or interest groups in an attempt to be reelected (‘buying’ votes). They may 
also act in collusion with cronies to conceal the corruption. Such collusive behavior 
tends to occur when the long-term relationship between governors and particular 
interest groups can act to enhance collective active action. If there is no term limit 
on governors’ time in office, final-term political shirking does not occur (DeBacker 
2012; Parker & Dabros 2012). Hence, the relationship is stable and persistent, 
which increases the benefit of the corruption. In other words, a no-term-limit 
provides governors the incentive to increase the probability of being reelected, 
which provides the incentive to collude and thereby engage in corrupt activities.1 
That is, having the same person in power for a long period gives rise to corruption.2 
Under such situations, certain policies such as the enactment of an information 
disclosure ordinance are considered critical to discourage collusive behavior, 
increasing benefits to citizens.3  
In local government in Japan, there is no term limit for local governors. I believe 
it is critical to limit the term. However, there is an argument that longer-serving 
                                                   
1 There is an argument that term limits attenuate the incentive to establish a positive 
political reputation via superior performance (Besley & Case 1995; Johnson and Crain 
2004). However, the majority of citizens is regarded as the rational ignorant and do not 
evaluate a governor ’s political performance (Downs 1957). As a consequence, a political 
reputation tends to be built among special interest groups rather than ordinary citizens. 
Kawaura (2013) found that the absence of a term limit meant that mayors expanded 
their government activities and their policies were directed toward excessive 
government presence in Japanese municipalities. 
2 Concerning legislators’ tenures, “as legislators become longer tenured, they are more 
able to provide benefits to interest groups because: (1) they gate greater control over the 
agenda and eventual legislative outcomes; (2) additional years of on-the-job legislative 
experience lead to a greater effectiveness at getting bills passed” (Sobel & Ryan 2012, 
175). 
3 It is found that enactment of an information disclosure ordinance reduces the benefits 
for special interest groups and so discourages rent-seeking behavior (Yamamura & 
Kondoh 2013). 
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officials become more effective at using their experience to advance public policy. 
For instance, experienced legislators are more effective through the skills they have 
learnt through learning-by-doing (Miquel and Snyder 2006). Furthermore, 
long-term relationships help to reduce the transaction cost between governors and 
other agents.4 These positive effects are reduced by limiting the term of office, 
which prevents experienced governors from being reelected. Where the term is not 
limited, it is important to disclose government information and thereby increase 
governmental transparency. Information asymmetry between citizens and government 
enables the governor and special interest groups to collude for the sake of their own 
benefits, resulting in government failure. On the assumption that citizens can obtain 
sufficient information regarding the government and the provision of public services or 
subsidies, citizens are able to publically condemn corruption within public sectors. This 
will reduce the probability of government failure. However, governors and special 
interest groups attempt to hamper information disclosure because this would be 
detrimental to their vested interests. Data from OECD countries show that fiscal 
transparency seems to reduce information asymmetry, resulting in the reduction of 
public debt and deficit (Alt and Lassen 2006). Using data from 41 OECD and less 
developed countries, Benito and Bastida (2009) found a positive relationship between 
budget transparency and national government fiscal balance.  
Information disclosure can publically expose corruption, forcing governors to 
leave their posts and lose their interest. Thus, the disclosure of information reduces 
the incentive for collusion between a governor and his cronies. Information 
disclosure ordinances (IDOs) are beneficial for ordinary citizens and IDOs act to 
reduce the interest of governors and associates. Under such a situation, a governor 
will not make a positive effort to introduce an IDO and has an incentive to delay the 
timing of its enactment. Furthermore, the longer the governor holds office, the less 
likely the IDO will be enacted. If this holds true, limiting the term of office 
contributes to the enactment of the IDO, reducing information asymmetry. Hence, it 
is worthwhile to investigate how a governor’s years in office are associated with the 
probability of IDO enactment. An examination into this issue has never been 
empirically investigated. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to tackle this 
empirical question. 
Since 1987 in Japan, prefecture-level local governments have been introducing IDOs. 
By 2001, all local governments had has promulgated IDOs. The enacting of IDOs to 
                                                   
4 Institutional structures of congress possibly reduce transaction costs and limit 
coalition formation (Weingast & Marshall 1988). 
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assure fair governance has ensured that government activity has become more 
transparent and has enhanced citizens’ participation and local autonomy in Japan (Uga 
2001). Based on a prefecture-level dataset from 1987 to 2001, this paper examines 
whether the number of years that local governors hold office influences the timing of 
IDO promulgation. The major finding using survival regression analysis is that the 
longer local governors hold office, the less is likely it is that the ordinance will be 
enacted.  
Section 2 provides a brief review of IDOs in Japan. Section 3 explains the data and 
methods used. Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations. The final section offers 
concluding observations. 
 
 
2. Review of information disclosure in Japan and hypothesis 
 
The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in the United States in 1967. 
Approximately 30 years later in 1999, central government enacted an information 
disclosure law in Japan. However, rather than the central government taking the lead, 
prefecture-level local governments in Japan have been central in disclosing public 
information.5 A Japanese prefecture is the equivalent to a state in the United States or 
a province in Canada. As is shown in Appendix, there are 47 prefectures in Japan.6 In 
1987, Akita and Saga prefectures became the first to promulgate an IDO. IDOs signify 
the regulations of a particular local government, providing residents the right to 
request the disclosure of information possessed by that body. In contrast, nine 
prefectures held out for some time before finally promulgating an IDO. On closer 
examination, Figure 1 indicates that the promulgation of IDOs rose substantially, 
especially from 1995.  
When an IDO is enforced, citizens are able to identify fraudulent interests on the 
part of governors, private firms, or special interest groups. Such fraudulent interests 
include the corrupt use of public funds, cheating, and collusion. Before 1987, there were 
no IDOs at the prefecture level. Bureaucrats behaved improperly, for instance, by 
claiming expenses for business trips that were never taken. However, such corruptive 
behavior was not disclosed to citizens. Another example of fraudulent acts relates to the 
constraint on politicians that they not engage in side businesses. However, there is 
                                                   
5 IDOs are based on the right to know (Muroi 1999). 
6 Prefectures consist of municipalities, towns and villages. Municipalities, towns, and 
villages are the lowest level of local government. At this level, in 1982, the town of 
Kanayama in northeast Japan became the first to enact an IDO (Muroi 1999). 
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evidence that some politicians own firms that engaged in construction work for local 
governments (Asano 2010). It has also been observed that subsidies were widely 
provided to sectors with strong electoral leverage, enabling local governments to heap 
funds on public works projects. With the introduction of IDOs, the process by which 
suppliers of public services are appointed is now transparent. Consequently, 
inappropriate behavior by politicians is deterred. The IDO enables citizens to scrutinize 
any possible collusion among politicians, bureaucrats, and private firms. In a number of 
prefectures, as a result of the enforcement of IDOs, the practice of local bureaucrats 
using public funds to entertain central bureaucrats has been essentially abolished 
(Matsui 2000, p. 6). Details of bureaucrats’ business trips can now be scrutinized by the 
public (Matsui 2000, p. 6). Therefore, IDOs have made a great contribution to improve 
the efficiency of local government.  
Thanks to the enforcement of the IDO in Japan, the welfare of citizens has been 
increased. However, governors, politicians and special interest groups were not 
supportive of IDO enactments because they feared losing the benefit of information 
asymmetry between local government and citizens. During the process of enacting IDOs, 
some bureaucrats attempted to weaken the reach of the transparency mechanism 
(Tsuruoka & Asaoka 1997). Furthermore, governments that remain in power for an 
extended period are more likely to engage in corruption via long-term interactions 
between governors and interest groups, resulting in greater self-interest. Therefore, a 
governor that holds office for longer period is less likely to welcome IDO enactment. 
Based on these observations I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: The greater the number of years that a governor holds office, the later an 
IDO is enacted. 
 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
 
During the study period 1987—2001, all 47 prefectures promulgated IDOs (Figure 1). 
Table A1 in Appendix shows that two or three governors held the same office in a 
prefecture during this period. In total, 88 governors held office in 47 prefectures for 15 
years (an average of 1.87 governors per prefecture). A more detailed situation is 
illustrated in Figure 2. In the case of Prefecture A, the governor was in office before 
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1987 and then promulgated the IDO before losing office. There is one governor in 
Prefecture A in the data. Regarding Prefecture B, the first governor was in position 
before 1987 and was replaced by a second governor before promulgating an IDO. The 
second governor then promulgated the IDO during his term. In this case, there are two 
governors. As for Prefectures C and D, the first and the second governors did not 
promulgate an IDO and a third governor did so before losing office. Prefecture D was 
the last prefecture to promulgate an IDO. Considering Figure 2 and Table A1 jointly 
suggest that 15 prefectures experienced the same situation as Prefecture A, 23 followed 
Prefecture B, and 9 followed Prefectures C or D. Three prefectures experienced the 
same situation as outlined for Prefecture D. Figure 1 shows that the timing of the IDO 
promulgation is unknown for each governor during his term although the IDO was 
enacted after 1995 in most prefectures. Table 1 shows the timing. I see from Table 1 that 
IDOs were promulgated when governors held office for less than 5 years in 17 
prefectures, between 6 and 10 years in 15 prefectures, between 11 and 15 years in 8 
prefectures, and more than 16 years in 7 prefectures. This implies that the longer the 
number of years in office, the less likely that governors will promulgate IDOs, which is 
consistent with the Hypothesis.  
Definitions and basic statistics concerning the key variables used in this paper are 
presented in Table 2. Data of the year of IDO promulgation in each prefecture were 
sourced the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Local Administration 
Bureau, Local Administration Management Assistant Office.7 Years in office, Age, 
Female dummy, and LDP Ratio were sourced from Sunahara (2011).8 Other variables 
were sourced from Asahi Shimbun (2008). 
 
3.2. Methods 
 
To examine the hypotheses raised previously, survival analysis was employed to 
investigate the timing of IDO promulgation (Greene 1997). This paper used Gompertz 
                                                   
7 Regarding IDOs, I requested data on the year of promulgation for IDOs in each 
prefecture from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Local 
Administration Bureau, Local Administration Management Assistant Office. 
Promulgation date and enforcement date were obtained. The decision making of 
governors is thought to be more precisely reflected in promulgation rather than 
enforcement. Hence, this paper focuses on promulgation year. However, even when 
enforcement year is used instead of promulgation year, the estimation results did not 
changed. Results when the timing of IDO enforcement is examined are available from 
the author upon request. 
8 http://www.geocities.jp/yosuke_sunahara/data/data.html (accessed on March 19, 
2013). 
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regression estimation. In the Gompertz model, hazard rates increase or decrease 
exponentially with time. Hazard function is expressed as: 
h                   , 
where   is the vector of the independent variables and   is the vector of is coefficients. 
Key variables included in  , as shown in Table 2, are Year in service, Age, Female 
dummy, LDP ratio, and Female ratio and LDP ratio. If   is positive, the hazard 
function increases with time. If   is negative, the hazard function decreases with time. 
If   is zero, the hazard function is constant for all t and so the model reduces 
exponentially. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the hazard rate is considered to increase 
with time; thus, the Gompertz model is considered to be more appropriate for these 
types of estimations than other models.9 
The effect of key variables in examining the Hypotheses is Years in office. If the 
hazard ratio of its coefficient is smaller than 1, the longer governor holds office the later 
he promulgated the IDO. The older the governor becomes, the smaller the long term 
benefit of concealing the information regarding corruption because older governors are 
more likely to retire. To control this effect, Age is included. I assume that older 
governors have less negative feelings toward the enactment of the IDO. If this holds 
true, the hazard ratio of Age is larger than 1. In addition, gender is thought to be 
important in considering IDO promulgation because typically in Japan the social status 
of females is lower than males; therefore, women are more willing to partake in political 
decision making to improve their position. To capture this, Female dummy (the gender 
of governor) and Female ratio (ratio of female population) are incorporated.10 The 
hazard ratios of these variables are expected to be larger than 1 because females are 
more positive towards IDOs than males.  
It is recognized in Japan that special interest groups engage in lobbying activities, 
leading to government inefficiency and numerous budget deficits (Doi & Ihori 2002; Doi 
& Ihori 2009, Ch.7).11  Some local governments enjoy benefits from corruption by 
colluding with such groups. Where an IDO has not been enforced because of information 
asymmetry between governments and citizens, politicians are likely to place a higher 
                                                   
9 A Weibull regression model is also considered appropriate for estimations when the 
hazard rate decreases or increases. However, regarding the Cox-Snell residuals in this 
study, estimation results using a Gompertz model have a better fit than those using the 
Weibull model. Hence, the Gompertz model is used in this paper. 
10 Only 3 governors were female among the 88 governors in the data; this mirrors the 
inferior social status of females in Japan. 
11 “Agriculture-related public capital, fishing ports, flood-control measures, and forest 
conservation have been over-funded as a result of the lobbying activities of local-interest 
groups” (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.181). 
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priority on their own interests at the expense of citizens’ welfare. In Japan, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) was the ruling party for some time after World War II. Hence, 
LDP politicians engaged in collusion to further their interests. It would follow then that 
a higher ratio of LDP politicians in a local assembly would mean less support for IDOs. 
Such conjecture leads me to predict that the hazard ratio of LDP ratio will be smaller 
than 1.   
Considering Figures 1 and 2 together, even if years in office are equal, its effect on 
the probability of IDO promulgation differs according to the period when the governor 
was in office. For instance, with a period of three years in office, the effect is different 
between governors who were in office at the end of the 1980s and those at the end of the 
1990s. To control this difference, cohort effects should be controlled for. That is, the first 
year of office is incorporated using cohort dummies.12 I constructed two different sets of 
dummies: cohorts with a 10-year 13interval and those with a 5-year interval.14  
Various control variables were also included as dependent variables to control for 
social, economic and political conditions in each prefecture. Concerning a prefecture’s 
characteristics, the following variables were incorporated: region dummies,15 per capita 
income, population density, land area, Hirfindahl index of politician’s party in the local 
assembly, and election year dummy. In terms of a governor ’s characteristics, I included: 
dummy for governor ’s experience of vice-governor, dummy for governor ’s former 
occupation as a bureaucrat, and dummy for governor ’s former occupation being a 
businessman.  
 
4. Results 
 
Before entering a discussion of the estimation results, I will first comment on the 
                                                   
12 When the first year is directly incorporated as an independent variable, estimation 
cannot reach convergence. Hence, cohort dummies are used in this paper. 
13 The dummy takes 1 when the first year is prior to 1970, otherwise 0. The dummy 
takes 1 when the first year is between 1970 and 1979, otherwise 0. The dummy takes 1 
when the first year is between 1980 and 1989, otherwise 0. The dummy takes 1 when 
the first year is after 1990, otherwise 0. 
14 The dummy takes 1 when the first year is prior to 1970, otherwise 0. The dummy 
takes 1 when the first year is between 1971 and 1975, otherwise 0. The dummy takes 1 
when the first year is between 1976 and 1980, otherwise 0. The dummy takes 1 when 
the first year is between 1981 and 1985, otherwise 0. The dummy takes 1 when the first 
year is between 1986 and 1990, otherwise 0. The dummy takes 1 when the first year is 
between 1991 and 1995, otherwise 0. The dummy takes 1 when the first year is between 
1996 and 2000, otherwise 0. The dummy takes 1 when the first year is after 2000, 
otherwise 0. 
15 I constructed 6 regional dummies consisting of 5 or 6 prefectures. 
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Cox-Snell residuals and their suitability to assess overall model fit (Cox & Snell 1968). 
If the model fits well, the jagged line approximates the reference straight line with slope 
1. Figure 3 illustrates the goodness of fit in columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) of Table 3. A 
cursory examination of Figure 3 shows that the model in column (1) fits the data better 
than other columns. Hence, from the viewpoint of goodness of fit, the results in column 
(1) are preferred to other columns.  
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation.16 Columns (1) and (2) show the results 
when the 10-year cohort dummies are used. Columns (3) and (4) shows the results when 
the 5-year cohort dummies are used. The results show that   is larger than 1 and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns, which implies that hazard rates 
increase with time. This is in line with Figure 1. In terms of Years in office, the hazard 
ratio is smaller than 1 and is statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns, 
which suggests the estimation results to be robust regarding alternative specifications. 
This implies that the longer a governor holds office, the less likely an IDO is to be 
enacted. This is consistent with the Hypothesis proposed earlier. Furthermore, its 
hazard ratios are 0.88 and 0.78 in columns (1) and (2), respectively. This can be 
interpreted as implying that a 1-year increase in office decreases the likelihood that an 
IDO is enacted by 12 or 22%. The likelihood reduces to 0.32 and 0.31 in columns (3) and 
(4), respectively. This implies that a 1-year increase in office decreases the likelihood 
that an IDO is enacted by 68 or 69%. This difference depends on how cohort dummies 
are defined. As shown in Figure 3, the model in column (1) fits better than the other 
models and hence 1 year holding office is considered to reduce the probability of the 
enactment of an IDO by 12%. The hazard ratios of the LDP ratio is 0.84 to 0.91, which 
are smaller than 1. Hence, this is consistent with the prediction that the higher the 
ratio of LDP, the lower the probability of IDO enactment. Furthermore, a 1% increase in 
the LDP ratio leads to a decrease in the likelihood that an IDO is enacted by 9–16%. The 
hazard ratios of Age, Female dummy, and Female ratio are larger than 1, with the 
exception of Female ratio in column (2). These results are in line the prediction. 
However, they are not statistically significant and therefore these variables are not 
associated with the likelihood of IDO enactment.  
                                                   
16 The subjects within groups correlated because they share the same condition, which 
is analogous to the time invariant fixed effects in the panel data regression model. In 
this paper, the error terms for the governor might correlate because unobservable 
individual characteristics are shared for the term the same governor was in office. 
Furthermore, the standard errors of the coefficients might be biased downward 
(Moulton 1990). To control for this bias, robust standard errors are calculated by 
clustering on the governor;, z-values are then obtained by cluster–robust standard 
errors. 
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The combined results of Tables 3 strongly support the Hypothesis. In this paper, only 
governor ’s attitude regarding IDOs was investigated. However, governors are thought 
to be self-interest seeking, resulting in reduced benefits for citizens. From this I derive 
the argument that the term of governor should be limited to deter corruptive behavior 
because a governor ’s self-interest becomes larger when they hold office for longer 
periods.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
When a local governor holds the same office for a number of years, he is more 
likely to pursue his own interests and provide benefits to interest groups through 
collusion with associates. This tendency is more likely to be observed if information 
asymmetry between government and citizens is larger. Hence, IDOs are anticipated 
to play a critical role in attenuating government failure by publically exposing 
corruption within government. However, it is also plausible that experienced 
governors can work to effectively to increase the social welfare of society through 
learning-by-doing or by reducing transaction costs. This holds true if governors 
behave as benevolent rulers rather than pursuing self-interests. If a governor is 
benevolent, he takes a positive attitude toward the promulgation of an IDO. In 
contrast, if a governor seeks self-interest, he takes a negative attitude. This paper 
attempts to empirically explore such attitudes, based on Japanese prefecture-level 
data from 1987 to 2001.  
The major finding of this study, using a survival regression analysis, is that the longer 
a local governor holds office, the less likely it is that an IDO is promulgated. 
Furthermore, the higher the ratio of conservative LDP in a local assembly, the longer it 
takes to promulgate the IDO. Various special interest groups are known to support the 
LDP. Hence, politicians belonging to the LDP tend to oppose IDOs to conceal their 
fraudulent favors to such groups. I interpret the findings as implying that local 
governors and politicians in Japan pursue their self-interests to conceal their improper 
influences. Thus, a clear policy implication from the results of this study is that the 
term of local governors should be limited to deter corruption and collusive behavior of 
governors by exposing such influence.  
Evidence provided in this paper is based on data from Japan. The economic and 
political conditions in Japan are different from Western countries such as the United 
States and European countries. Hence, it seems unreasonable to generalize the 
conclusion drawn from such specialized data. It is therefore necessary to investigate 
11 
 
how the term of governors is associated with the degree of government information 
disclosure based on data from Western countries. In addition, this paper does not 
directly examine how governors’ years in office influence their behavior to serve their 
interests. To clarify this point, an examination is required regarding how a governor’s 
term is associated with corruptive behavior (e.g., receiving money as a bribe to favor the 
interest group). This is an issue that can be addressed in future studies. 
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Figure 1. Total number of prefectures that promulgated information disclosure ordinances. 
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Figure 2. Timeline of governors’ promulgations for each prefecture. 
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Figure 3. Cox-Snell residuals for estimations reported in Table 3. 
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Table 1. Governors’ years in office and number of promulgations 
  
Years in 
office 
Number of 
promulgations 
1 4 
2 4 
3 1 
4 4 
5 4 
6 2 
7 4 
8 3 
9 5 
10 1 
12 3 
14 3 
15 2 
16 1 
20 3 
21 1 
22 1 
24 1 
Total 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Basic statistics and definitions for variables  
 Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Years in office Number of years as governor (consecutive years) 8.63 5.73 
Age Governor ’s age 64.6 8.40 
Female 
dummy 
Takes 1 if governor is female, otherwise 0 0.007 --- 
LDP ratio Ratio of local legislators belonging to Liberal Democratic 
Party in a local assembly (%) 
52.4 12.7 
Female ratio Ratio of female population in a prefecture 51.4 0.96 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Duration analysis (Gompertz regression) 
          (1)          (2)        (3)        (4) 
 Hazard 
Ratio 
z-statistics Hazard 
Ratio 
z-statistics Hazard 
Ratio 
z-statistics Hazard 
Ratio 
z-statistics 
Years in office 0.88*** –2.70 0.78*** –2.84 0.32*** –3.40 0.31*** –2.94 
Age   1.02 1.39   1.06 0.92 
Female dummy   8.24 1.39   1.14 0.07 
LDP ratio 0.91*** –3.20 0.88*** –3.40 0.89*** –2.96 0.84*** –3.18 
Female ratio   0.87 –0.30   1.15 0.28 
Cohort 10 years2         Yes       Yes         No       No 
Cohort 5 years2 
 
        No       No         Yes       Yes 
Region dummies2 No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes 
Characteristics of 
governors2 
        Yes       Yes         Yes       Yes 
Characteristics of 
prefecture 2 
        Yes       Yes         Yes       Yes 
  
<p-value> 
       1.02*** 
      <0.00> 
   1.49*** 
   <0.00> 
2.18*** 
<0.00> 
2.40*** 
<0.00> 
Wald test 
<p-value> 
    229.7*** 
  <0.00> 
337.6*** 
<0.00> 
203.5***  
 <0.00> 
355.6***  
<0.00> 
Number of clusters 
(governors) 
    88 88 88  88 
Number of failures        47       47        47           47 
Observations        608       608        608           608 
  
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the governor. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
2. “No” means dummies are not included and “Yes” means dummies are included. 
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Appendix.  
Table A1. List of prefectures’ year of promulgation and number of governors 
 
 
Name 
Year of 
promulgation 
Number of 
governors 
  
Name 
Year of 
promulgation 
Number of 
governors 
1 Hokkaido 1998 2 
 
25 Shiga 2000 2 
2 Aomori 1999 2 
 
26 Kyoto 2001 1 
3 Iwate 1998 3 
 
27 Osaka 1999 3 
4 Miyagi 1999 3 
 
28 Hyogo 2000 1 
5 Akita 1987 1 
 
29 Nara 2001 2 
6 Yamagata 1997 2 
 
30 Wakayama 2001 3 
7 Fukushima 2000 2 
 
31 Tottori 2000 2 
8 Ibaragi 2000 2 
 
32 Shimane 2000 1 
9 Tochigi 1999 1 
 
33 Okayama 1996 1 
10 Gunma 2000 2 
 
34 Hiroshima 2001 2 
11 Saitama 2000 2 
 
35 Yamaguchi 1997 2 
12 Chiba 2000 1 
 
36 Tokushima 2001 2 
13 Tokyo 1999 3 
 
37 Kagawa 2000 2 
14 Kanagawa 2000 2 
 
38 Ehime 1998 1 
15 Niigata 2001 3 
 
39 Kochi 1990 1 
16 Toyama 2001 1 
 
40 Fukuoka 2001 2 
17 Ishikawa 2000 2 
 
41 Saga 1987 1 
18 Fukui 2000 1 
 
42 Nagasaki 2001 2 
19 Yamanashi 1999 2 
 
43 Kumamoto 2000 3 
20 Nagano 2000 1 
 
44 Oita 2000 1 
21 Gifu 2000 2 
 
45 Miyazaki 1999 1 
22 Shizuoka 2000 2 
 
46 Kagoshima 2000 3 
23 Aichi 2000 2 
 
47 Okinawa 2001 3 
24 Mie 1999 2 
  
Total …. 88 
 
 
 
 
 
